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Abstract

ew environmentalists have positive things to say on the
impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the
environment. WTO legal obligations are frequently cited
as the most significant impediment to a range of environmental
initiatives, including notably meaningful international coordination to combat climate change, particularly through carbon tax
initiatives, and imposition of electronic waste disposal export
bans. In this vein, adverse findings of WTO dispute panels on
environmental conservation measures tend to attract the ire of
international civil society. The tensions between liberal trade and
environmental protection can be traced back to the days of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, which
pre-dated the WTO. Under the GATT 1947, trade and environment disputes tended to be resolved through diplomatic channels. The WTO Agreements were intended to provide a more
predictable and legalistic means by which to resolve such disputes, in exchange for deeper commitments on domestic regulation, a domain historically deemed off limits to international
disciplines. Two of these agreements in particular, the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),
introduced binding disciplines with serious implications for
domestic environmental decision-making, a subset of domestic
regulation. The expectation was that the depolitization of WTO
disputes would afford more certainty to regulators. This has
decidedly not turned out to be the case. This paper explores why
this is so, focusing notably on the role of the WTO and Appellate
Body Secretariats in shaping domestic regulation jurisprudence
under the GATT, SPS and TBT Agreements. It argues that the
Appellate Body has misapplied important features of the SPS
and TBT Agreements to sometimes wrongly condemn environmental regulations, owing to a cognitive bias against trade
distortions. It argues for an alternative approach that stays more
faithful to the text of the WTO Agreements.

I. Introduction
International economic law and international environmental law have developed considerably over the past decades.
The WTO Agreements, the focus of this paper, entered into
force in January 1995, and set binding disciplines on a range
of trade-related disciplines ranging from goods and services,
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to investment, intellectual property, and product standards. In
parallel, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), among other institutions, has served as
a capable forum to coordinate state action to reduce thematic
cross-border environmental externalities. Yet, there is surprisingly little formal cross-fertilization between trade and the environment. Instead, environmental regulation is typically framed
in trade literature as derogating from core WTO obligations.
The possibilities for cross-fertilization between both disciplines are infinite, and certainly well beyond the bounds of this
paper. Suffice it to state that these disciplines are not natural
antagonists: the development of “green” industries can foster
growth opportunities in new markets.1 Trade measures, in turn,
can steer states towards cleaner and greener development trajectories.2 The preamble to the GATT, now part of the WTO legal
framework, contemplates that economic relations should raise
“standards of living” and lead to “the full use of the resources of
the world”.3 GATT 1947 drafters thus contemplated decades ago
that economic growth need not come at the expense of the global
commons. Despite these provisions, a few years before becoming part of the WTO framework, the GATT Secretariat faced
sharp criticism from environmentalists and civil society actors
for its handling of two disputes focusing on United States (US)
dolphin conservation measures restricting the sale of imported
tuna products.4 The GATT panels concerned made broad statements seemingly indicating that such conservation measures
were per se inconsistent with Contracting Parties’ GATT obligations.5 These panel reports were subsequently not adopted into
the GATT acquis by the Contracting Parties.
The GATT regulated tariff bindings. By the 1960s, these
bindings reached levels below which tariff increases from
applied to bound levels could no longer afford meaningful
protection to domestic industries. GATT exporters grew increasingly wary of so-called “non-tariff barriers”, such as product
standards similar in operation to those the US had applied to
tuna imports.6 During the Tokyo Round of negotiations of 1974,
GATT Parties pressed for a special negotiating group on standards.7 This yielded the plurilateral Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (the Standards Code), which 46 Contracting
* Ravi Soopramanien is an attorney-at-law. He previously served as a Legal Officer at both the World Trade Organization and the African Development Bank’s
Energy, Environment and Climate Chance Department.
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Parties joined.8 The Standards Code inspired further product
standards negotiations in parallel sessions held by technical barriers and agriculture groups set up during the Uruguay Round of
negotiations establishing the WTO legal framework.9
Inasmuch as it is common to refer to the WTO legal framework in the singular, it should be borne in mind that the WTO
Agreements are a series of inter-related and inter-state treaties.
During the Uruguay Round, these agreements were negotiated in
15 different working groups, with little to no coordination among
them initially.10 Towards the close of negotiations, the notion of
the “single undertaking” gained traction — pursuant to which the
results of the negotiations were deemed to form a “single package” joined together by the Marrakech Agreement Establishing
the WTO.11 This led to a scramble to better coordinate among the
different agreements, which Members resisted to avoid disturbing the negotiated texts. The SPS and TBT Agreements emerged
from these negotiations and both regulate product standards. The
SPS Agreement applies to product standards adopted to protect
human, animal or plant health from the spread of pests, and from
dangerous additives, contaminants, toxins, and disease-causing
organisms contained in foodstuffs.12 The TBT Agreement applies,
residually, to all other product standards.13 Together, the GATT,
SPS and TBT Agreements impose measures restricting adverse
trade impacts of Members’ domestic regulation. Given the ease
with which any domestic environmental regulation can be construed as restricting trade, the collective reach of these agreements
to environmental laws is broad.
Environmental regulation can typically distort trade in three
ways.14 The first is through a complete ban on those imported
products that produce environmental externalities. 15 The second
is through a partial ban, on imports using a particular process and
production method (PPM) resulting in an environmental externality. Where such PPM is amended or altered to the importing
Member’s satisfaction, subject products may re-access the relevant market.16 It will become clear in my below discussion of
relevant WTO jurisprudence, that most trade and environment
disputes tend to implicate this second distortion, inasmuch as
complaining Members have a tendency to “frame” a particular
environmental regulation as having the effect of partially limiting market access to the respondent Member’s domestic market. The third is through sanctions, under which all or some of
a Member’s imports are subject to punitive import restrictions
following a serious environmental transgression.17 This latter
category, outside some very limited exceptions,18 runs counter
to the WTO’s ban on unilateral remedial measures.
This paper will address the scope of environmental regulation under the WTO Agreements. It will do so by reviewing
WTO dispute settlement reports on environmental regulation
under the GATT, SPS and TBT Agreements. This paper will
demonstrate that these reports have followed uniform GATT
canons of interpretation. This paper posits that the Appellate
Body, the WTO’s judicial appellate organ, has followed these
canons of interpretation owing to a cognitive bias exhibited in its
trade and environment disputes, in favor of GATT-driven principles that has enabled it to regulate away internal inconsistencies
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in the application of environmental regulations under three very
different agreements. This paper will conclude that this bias, as
manifested in recent TBT dispute reports, has resulted in the
narrowing of the scope of the TBT Agreement beyond whatever
was intended or foreseen by WTO draftspersons. This paper will
posit that this is due principally to a human element that is by
and large ignored in the literature.
Section II will introduce the WTO and Appellate Body
Secretariats. Section III will discuss prevailing theories on the
challenges that trade and environment disputes pose to the WTO.
These theories, most of which were presented over a decade ago
at the height of WTO dispute settlement activity on environment
conservation measures, are still influential in trade circles. I
will outline an alternative explanation for the evolution of this
activity. Section IV will summarize WTO provisions relevant to
environmental regulation. Section V will give an overview of the
Appellate Body’s “guide” to environmental regulation in disputes
under the GATT, SPS and TBT Agreements. It will demonstrate
that the Appellate Body has transposed GATT principles into
later SPS and TBT disputes in a manner that, particularly in the
case of the TBT Agreement, has blurred important distinctions
between different sets of obligations. Section VI will conclude
with recommendations.

II. The WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats
The WTO is composed of two Secretariats: the WTO and
Appellate Body Secretariats. The WTO website summarizes the
WTO Secretariat’s main duties as follows:
“to supply technical and professional support for the
various councils and committees, to provide technical
assistance for developing countries, to monitor and
analyze developments in world trade, to provide information to the public and the media and to organize the
ministerial conferences. The Secretariat also provides
some forms of legal assistance in the dispute settlement
process and advises governments wishing to become
Members of the WTO.”19
The WTO Secretariat supports Member actions in relation
to the WTO Agreements’ three pillars: negotiations, monitoring
and dispute settlement.20 The Appellate Body Secretariat, in contrast, “provides legal and administrative support to the Appellate
Body”21, and thus only supports the last of these pillars.22
Negotiations under the first pillar are held under the auspices of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), mandated to
negotiate deeper market access commitments and binding rules.
Monitoring under the second pillar is carried out under the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Dispute settlement under
the third pillar is formally governed by the Membership acting
jointly as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). There is something of a fluidity to the three pillars: Members negotiate new
market access commitments. These and pre-existing commitments are regularly monitored and, where required, enforced by
WTO dispute settlement. This structure has been reversed lately,
with Members seeking to push new market access commitments
5

through the backdoor of the third pillar.23 Below, I summarize
these developments.24

1. The Demise of the Negotiations Pillar
Uruguay Round negotiators, wary of civil society criticism
and adverse press from the abovementioned GATT panel reports
condemning US dolphin conservation measures, had hoped that
a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) could reach a
political solution to environmental policy convergence. Sadly,
the CTE, composed largely of trade bureaucrats operating largely
behind closed doors, failed to deliver on this task. The CTE
effectively sought to ‘wish away’ the problem of environmental
disputes in the WTO by taking the now discredited position that
Members were unlikely to resort to WTO dispute settlement,
where alternative dispute settlement mechanisms existed under
other environmental agreements.25 This is sometimes cited with
irony in the literature as the CTE’s one meaningful contribution to the trade and environment polemic.26 As this paper will
elaborate in some detail, the CTE’s failure, rather than yielding
a negotiated solution to environmental regulation in the WTO,
instead forced environmental regulation into the domain of
WTO dispute settlement panels. The result is that the Appellate
Body is vested with the final say on the WTO-conformity of any
such regulation.
The result is that Members adopt environmental laws
under conditions of uncertainty: such measures are liable to
challenge by another Member, and to be deemed to violate the
WTO Agreements by a dispute panel, thus exposing the adopting Members to trade countermeasures. This uncertainty has
hindered institutional developments in the fields of international
economic law and international environmental law. On the
former, the ease by which Members can trigger dispute settlement procedures stands in contradistinction to the difficulty of
successfully negotiating new trade disciplines. This has led to a
collective and progressive loss of faith in the WTO’s ability to
serve as a forum for deeper multilateral integration, culminating
recently in the collapse of the Doha Development round of negotiations.27 On the latter, concerns about the WTO-consistency
of proposed environmental agreements have led to a decline
in multilateral environmental negotiations — exemplified by
the slowdown in negotiations in Cartagena over the Biosafety
Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity.28

2. The Rise of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
WTO disputes are governed by the Understanding on rules
and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU)
annexed to the WTO Agreements. The DSU recognizes that
dispute settlement is a “central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system . . . it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions
of those agreements”.29 WTO disputes are formally initiated
at the request of the complainant Member, in respect of any
trade-related measure adopted or maintained by the respondent
Member. These Members must first attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. If they fail to do so the complainant Member
6

may request the establishment of a dispute panel, normally
composed of three trade diplomats. The panel’s final report can
be appealed to the seven-judge (formally, they are referred to as
“members”) Appellate Body on issues of law or legal interpretation.30 Typically, a division composed of three Appellate Body
members will review a given panel report.31 Nowadays, most
panel reports are appealed.32
WTO rules on the burden of proof emanate from general
principles of law, and require the complainant Member to assert
and prove its claim. A complainant Member will satisfy its
burden when it establishes a prima facie case, namely a case
which, in the absence of effective refutation by the respondent
Member, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favor of
the complainant Member.33 Where a complainant Member fails
to establish a prima facie case, its claim will fail for want of
meeting the burden of proof.
A panel’s standard of review under the DSU is neither de
novo, nor total deference: “a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.”34 For this purpose,
a panel may “seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body which it deems appropriate”, including
notably experts.35 In making findings and recommendations in
a given dispute, panels and the Appellate Body cannot “add to
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements.”36 Only Members can do so, by way of authoritative
interpretations under Art. IX:2 of the Marrakech Agreement.
The DSU recognizes that WTO dispute settlement is subject to
this qualification.37 The DSU contemplates that a panel’s role is
limited to assessing the relative strengths of the arguments presented by the disputing parties. Panels cannot make law, nor can
they stray beyond the claims presented to them.
Over time, the Appellate Body has implemented its duty to
provide ‘security and predictability’ in WTO Members’ treaty
obligations, under the DSU, in a manner that some would regard
as running counter to the DSU prohibition against ‘adding to or
diminishing from’ Members’ WTO treaty obligations. According
to the Appellate Body, adopted panel reports, while formally
binding only on the disputing parties, nevertheless “create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore should
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.”38
Appellate Body reports, further, seem to occupy a status in
between adopted panel reports and an authoritative interpretation. In one dispute, a panel departed from “well-established
Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the
same legal issues”, namely on the use of the so-called “zeroing”
methodology39 in antidumping investigations. The Appellate
Body roundly condemned the panel for doing so, and interpreted
the DSU as requiring a panel “absent cogent reasons” to “resolve
the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.”40
In constraining panels, the Appellate Body introduced stare
decisis and judicial law making through the backdoor. It bears
mentioning, in this regard, that the Appellate Body has never
explicitly reversed itself or openly modified its prior reasoning
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

on a legal question in its more than 20 years of existence.41 This
may come as a surprise to the reader, given that the seven judges
serving it do so under staggered four-year terms with the possibility of only one contract renewal.42 Further, some of these
judges do not have their primary residence in Switzerland. It
becomes less of a surprise, however, if the reader considers the
understated role the Appellate Body Secretariat plays in facilitating the work of these seven Members. The enduring character
of Appellate Body jurisprudence would tend to suggest that the
WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats have a larger role to play
in facilitating the role of the DSB than has been chronicled in the
literature. Indeed, the role of both the WTO and Appellate Body
Secretariats is surprisingly ignored in the literature.43
Formally, panelists and Appellate Body Members rule on the
outcome of a dispute. They normally do so by consensus, notwithstanding provisions in the DSU for the issuance of separate or dissenting opinions. Panel and Appellate Body disputes are guided
by the two Secretariats.44 The WTO Secretariat influences panels
in two important respects. First, while disputing Members can
agree upon panel composition, they typically do not. WTO litigation is expensive, and can sometimes implicate trade volumes
reaching towards the billions of dollars. With so much at stake,
disputing Members will typically request the WTO DirectorGeneral to compose a neutral panel, acting on the advice of his
staff.45 Second, Panelists are often guided by the legal, factual
and technical assistance provided by Secretariat staff, notably in
the form of background papers that digest volumes of prior WTO
jurisprudence and reams of factual exhibits and party arguments
into manageable documents.46 This process is repeated, mutatis
mutandis, by the Appellate Body Secretariat following appeals.
In most, if not all cases, the authors of the background papers
prepared for panels and the Appellate Body are senior WTO legal
counselors who are advocating ingrained views on WTO legal
doctrine.47 The WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats’ rosters of
legal officers, some of whom served the GATT Secretariat prior
to the creation of the WTO, include some of the world’s foremost
trade law experts. After spending decades servicing dozens of
WTO disputes, it is inevitable that a number of these experts will
have developed ingrained views on WTO legal doctrine. Such
views, it follows, do not easily lend themselves to a reversal or
modification, from one dispute to the next.48
Below, I illustrate how a cognitive bias towards first-order
GATT-inspired market access and non-discrimination (what I
refer to as “first order”) principles that can be found in the analytical approach and sequencing employed in Appellate Body
dispute settlement reports on environmental regulation had led
to a line of jurisprudence that openly struggles with the WTOconsistency of environmental measures. Before doing so, I summarize alternative theories on trade and environment disputes.
This literature addresses WTO disputes in the broader framework
of “trade and” disputes, referring to those disputes that implicate
regulatory concerns extending well beyond the conventional
domain of a WTO dispute involving tariffs or quotas. I compare
these theories to my alternative account for the Appellate Body’s
analytical approach to environmental regulation.
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III. Prevailing Theories on
“Trade and” Disputes
“Trade and” disputes have generated a great deal of literature.
This section will give an overview of how trade scholars perceive
the problématique of “trade and” disputes in the WTO before
building on the above discussion of the Secretariats with an
alternative proposal.49 For ease of reference, I have grouped these
theories into three distinct categories. I have labeled these the
Hermetic Shift, the Constitutional Order and the DSU Conflict.
As I will set out below, the Hermetic Shift is premised on
the fragmentation of international legal disciplines. It questions
the merit of any convergence of disciplines, given the lack of
coherence in international relations. The Constitutional Order is
premised either on the existence of global administrative law or,
more ambitiously, constitutionalism of international law. Both
premises consider that international institutions act beyond the
autonomy conferred upon them by states, by drawing upon a preexisting or foundational set of international norms. Both premises further consider convergence a natural consequence of the
expanding role of international institutions. The DSU Conflict is
the most difficult to categorize. It is best defined as premised on
international legal pluralism: it recognizes the phenomenon of
convergence, without ascribing it any dominant value.50

1. The Hermetic Shift
Hermetic Shift theorists consider that international economic
law was designed to operate in a legal vacuum.51 To them, the
WTO was not designed to handle trade and environment disputes.
At its heart, the WTO stems from the dictates of economic theory:
its free trade rationale is rooted in Adam Smith’s laissez-faire52
and David Ricardo’s comparative advantage ideologies.53 Its historical development has consequently fallen out of step with those
of the UN institutions such as the UNFCCC, borne out of comity
and human rights.54 As one commentator, Donald McRae puts it:
“at the theoretical level, international trade law and international
law are in important respects based on different assumptions.
The organizing principle for the international trading regime is
the economic theory underlying a liberal trade order, that is the
principle of comparative advantage; the organizing principle for
international law, by comparison, is the concept of the sovereignty
of states . . . International law is built on the fundamental construct of a community of sovereign states whose relations with
each other is the substance of the discipline — international trade
law runs counter to that construct and in significant ways acts to
undermine it.”55
Despite these differences, these two disciplines have converged towards the end of the 20th century. As another commentator, Joost Pauwelyn states: “with the end of the Cold War
and the accession of many former communist countries to the
Bretton Woods institutions, the separation [between different fields of international law] was no longer self-evident. The
increased inter-dependence between states and between issueareas (e.g., trade and environment, human rights and economic
development) ma[kes] the strict separation between different
fields of international law all the more artificial.”56
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Jeffrey Dunoff, in a widely-cited paper, identified subjectmatter convergence as the driver of trade and environment disputes. Writing on the apparent demise of the international trade
regime, he describes the impact of so-called “trade and”57 issues
on two trade liberalization models, the realist58 collective action
model (CAM59) and the liberalist embedded liberalism model
(ELM60).61 Dunoff illustrated that both models are undermined
by “trade and” issues. CAM is premised on the failure, in international relations, that would result if states each acted individually in economic relations. “Trade and” issues, for Dunoff, frame
the failure instead as one of uneven distribution in substantive
international obligations. ELM, which juxtaposes shared
decision-making in international affairs with a state’s exclusive
control over domestic affairs, for Dunoff, is undermined as those
matters deemed domestic and thus reserved to the sovereign
prerogative of states are instead scrutinized in an international
forum. “Trade and” disputes thus blur the lines between the
domestic and international, and render the distinction drawn by
ELM a false dichotomy.62
Sanford Gaines, another trade scholar, finds that convergence between trade and environmental laws is problematic due
to the use of the more normative WTO dispute settlement mechanisms to induce compliance with non-WTO treaty obligations
that the DSU is poorly equipped to handle.63 For Gaines, while
“modern international trade law . . . has the relatively easy task
of establishing agreed ground rules about when and how governments are permitted to or prohibited from adopting national
policies that interfere with these private transactions or distort
the terms of market competition that drive the transactions . . .
environmental law is vastly more complex and contingent than
trade law: complex because almost every human behavior has
multiple environmental effects; contingent because regulation
of those effects depends on our incomplete, ever-changing, and
irreducibly uncertain scientific understanding of the natural
world.”64 For Hermetic Shift theorists, the WTO’s trade rules, if
used to adjudicate non-WTO environmental treaty terms beyond
the remit of ‘ordinary’ trade matters, will yield outcomes that
twist and turn the environmental treaty terms.

2. The Constitutional Order
Constitutional Order theorists consider that the prevalence
of trade and environment disputes signals the convergence of different legal disciplines in international relations. These theorists
thus propose a counter-narrative to proponents of fragmentation
in international law, such as DSU theorists. Beyond this, ‘constitutionalization’65 can mean different things to different commentators — and the debate has been aptly likened to the fabled
elephant in the hand of six blind men by one commentator.66
Against this caveat, Joseph Weiler and Ernst Petersmann are
the most frequently cited67 proponents of international constitutionalization. Weiler defines constitutionalization as possessing
a normative and social element. Writing on the formation of
the EU, he identified the normative element as the creation of
a ‘higher’ body of EU law. Weiler credits the European Court
of Justice with shaping the relationship between community law
8

and municipal law as one “indistinguishable from analogous
legal relationships in constitutional federal states.”68 The social
element, for Weiler, developed through the progressive formation of a federalized “European entity.” It is less clear whether
the normative element is a precondition to the social element.
However, in later and more doctrinal writing on legitimacy and
governance, he suggests that the social element is, indeed, the
“output” of the normative element.69
Writing on the WTO, 70 Weiler found elements of both present, but lacking in some important respects. On the normative
element, he found that the WTO Secretariat did not operate
completely free from ‘external influences’, by which he [probably] meant large trading Members’ influence. Weiler attributed
the lack of institutional independence to shortcomings with the
WTO’s judicial organs. Weiler considered that the Appellate
Body’s focus on Oxford English Dictionary definitions to ascertain the “ordinary meaning of words” and treaty provisions in
disputes, in particular, prevented it from meaningfully engaging
with the more difficult and systemic issues presented by “trade
and” disputes — issues capable of shaping the social element,
leading to an epistemic trade community. 71
For Petersmann, constitutionalization is a rights-based phenomenon.72 Unlike Weiler’s judge-driven model, Petersmann’s
model is premised on a more substantive notion of federalism
grounded in Kantian philosophy on individual autonomy and
freedom. In Petersmann’s view, international relations are conducted against the backdrop of unalterable fundamental rights.
International trade serves as a conduit for enjoyment of these
rights: “the fact that most people spend most of their time on
their ‘economic freedoms’ (e.g. to produce and exchange goods
and services including one’s labour and ideas) illustrates that, for
most people, economic liberties are no less important than civil
and political freedoms.”73 In Petersmann’s view, WTO panels
can and indeed should adjudicate more candidly on the full range
of “trade and” disputes, particularly those affecting the environment, and human rights. [More] Controversially, Petersmann
views Bretton Woods institutions, spearheaded by the GATT,
as creating a “right to trade”74 which must be weighed and balanced against these other fundamental rights.75
In later writing, Petersmann would focus on the fragmentation of human rights law, with emphasis on disparate
horizontal and regional instruments, and international economic
law, through studying the proliferation of bilateral investment
treaty obligations, to argue for a grander constitutional order
marshalled by a UN-led collective pursuit of human rights protection. In this vein, he would emphasize the need for judicial
cooperation in applying so-called “constitutional methodologies” to coordinate between judgments of various international
courts and tribunals.76 Petersmann would likely consider that
trade and environment disputes in the WTO should be (but aren’t
presently) adjudicated upon through adherence to uniform canons of international judicial adjudication, to avoid the types of
fragmentation problems that Hermetic Shift theorists observe in
relation to environmental regulation disputes.77
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3. The DSU Conflict
The DSU flipped GATT 1947 dispute settlement rules.
Under the GATT 1947, Contracting Parties could forum shop
within the GATT,78 and block adoption of an adverse panel
report owing to the positive consensus rule. This rule required
all Contracting Parties to vote in favor of a panel report before
it could become part of the GATT acquis, allowing the losing
party to block its adoption. Dispute settlement under the GATT
was thus weak, and Contracting Parties preferred negotiated
solutions to formal dispute settlement.79 Under the WTO, in contrast, a negative consensus rule results in the automatic adoption
of panel reports, except where all Members block it.80
Under the DSU, further, forum shopping is prohibited due to
the now-exclusive jurisdiction of WTO panels.81 Panel proceedings are subject to strict time frames, of six months for completion of panel reports and 60 days for completion of Appellate
Body reports.82 Once the findings and conclusions in these
reports are formally adopted by the DSB,83 the latter may recommend, where appropriate, that the respondent Member bring
its measures into conformity within a reasonable period of time.
Upon expiration of this period of time, the complaining Member
can, in principle,84 seek to retaliate through countermeasures
by securing permission — from the DSB — to suspend “concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.”85
Such retaliation, which is prospective in nature, may be fixed to
a level “equivalent” to the level of economic harm caused by the
offending measure(s).86
WTO dispute settlement is thus broad, compulsory, adversarial, and can often result in economic retaliation. DSU Conflict
Debate theorists focus on the first two aspects. They point out
that WTO treaty obligations are worded as open-ended prohibitions, violations of which can all too easily be alleged by
a complainant Member. They also point out that the terms of
the DSU oblige Members to resort to WTO dispute settlement
when seeking “the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of
the covered agreements.” 87 This leads them to argue that the
DSU has ‘attracted jurisdiction’ away from non-WTO treaties.
Gabrielle Marceau, a WTO legal counselor, phrases the problem
in the following terms: “a WTO Member may seek redress for a
violation of a human rights treaty before a human rights court.
Yet, WTO Members seem to have precluded themselves from
engaging in any debate on whether human rights courts would
order remedies having any trade-related impact inconsistent with
WTO law. At the same time, WTO Members have human rights
commitments, and all states must respect all their international
rights and obligations at all times.”88
Eric Posner and John Yoo consider that the DSU’s extensive
jurisdiction is so broad that it may actually deter sovereign states
from complying. To back this claim with empirical data, the
authors use proxy indicators for “effectiveness,” which they concede is a “difficult” measure to apply as a dependent variable.
Using the proxies of compliance, usage and budget to measure
effectiveness, the authors submit by means of a strong hypothesis
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that there is a negative correlation between effectiveness and
independence. A weaker hypothesis reserved by the authors is
that “there is no evidence for positive correlation between independence and effectiveness.” The authors conclude, based on
findings that Member States are taking conspicuously longer to
comply with DSB recommendations, that the DSB “will have
diminished chances of success, as already indicated by steps
being taken by states to avoid or weaken their jurisdiction.”89
DSU Conflict theorists, without necessarily ascribing any
value judgments to trade and environment disputes, attribute their
prevalence in the WTO to a procedural feature of dispute settlement rules. WTO panels, to them, simply have to deal with these
disputes in the best way possible. Where they stray too far, they
risk having their recommendations ignored by the losing party.

4. Assessment of the theories and an
alternative thesis

The Hermetic Shift theory considers that panels and the
Appellate Body do not have the tools to properly adjudicate
trade and environment disputes under the WTO Agreements.
The GATT 1947 dispute settlement mechanism gave Contracting
Parties a way out: the US, it is recalled, voted against adopting
those adverse GATT panel reports that restricted its ability to
adopt dolphin conservation measures. Such reports floated
around the GATT universe thereafter as specious sources of persuasive authority: out of sight, and out of mind. Under the WTO,
however, adoption is the default rule. Every trade and environmental dispute adjudicated by a panel creates new WTO ‘law’
that hurts or benefits either economic law or environmental law
foundations, at the cost of the other, and thus exacerbates fragmentation.90 In a similar vein, the DSU Conflict theory posits
that neither panels nor the Appellate Body really have a choice
in hearing a dispute: whenever Members frame a complaint as
a violation of WTO obligations, they must adjudicate upon the
matters raised therein. The Constitutional Order theory is more
prescriptive. It considers that fragmentation notwithstanding,
panels and the Appellate Body should engage with their broader
roles in an expanding trade or global constitution to resolve
“hard cases.” That the DSU “attracts jurisdiction”91 is, if anything, indicative of the need for such action.
Empirical evidence supporting any of these theories is weak.
The Hermetic Shift theory better summarizes the pre-WTO GATT
1947 position on trade and environment disputes. GATT panels
were wary that allowing environmental conservation measures
to pass muster would somehow allow these measures to ‘trump’
trade obligations. Yet, as will become clear in my below discussion
of the SPS and TBT Agreements, these two texts were specifically
designed with environmental regulation in mind. Rather than view
such regulation as a threat to the trading system, WTO drafters
saw the merit in setting some binding rules to limit the discriminatory or disproportionate elements of environmental regulation,
which panels are in turn meant to enforce. The DSU Conflict
theory, in turn, is circular — as applied to trade and environment
disputes, it assumes that any and all environmental measures can
be framed as a trade measure. Thus, under the expansive terms of
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the DSU, any environmental measure can be challenged before
a WTO panel. If this is indeed true, this has more to do with the
fact that most WTO obligations are drafted as open-ended prohibitions against certain conduct than with the DSU’s compulsory
jurisdiction clause per se. A further flaw with the DSU Conflict
theory is that it assumes away the critical role of states in initiating WTO disputes against trading partners. In the absence of any
prosecutorial authority vested in the two Secretariats, these states
are surely more to blame for the expansive reach of the DSU than
the text of the DSU itself. Lastly, the Constitutional Order theory
has explicitly been rejected by the Appellate Body, the same body
meant to be charged with creating an epistemological community
of free or liberalized traders.92 Leaving this aside, further, Panel
and Appellate Body reports are filled with claims that are not
addressed for reasons of “judicial economy”. One would expect
tribunals in a constitutional setting not to engage in such issueavoidance techniques, but rather make sweeping doctrinal statements on trade and environment principles.
I would propose a far more functional theory. Building upon
my discussion in the previous Section on the role legal officers
within the WTO and Appellate Body Secretariats, I would posit
that legal officers advise panels and the Appellate Body through
the lens of a GATT 1947 lawyer: with a keen eye for circumvention of GATT non-discrimination principles, and a sense of
skepticism, if not measured disdain, towards any measure that
curtails market access principles.93 This GATT 1947 perspective,
in turn, filters its way into panel and Appellate Body reports.
Whereas, as previously mentioned, the GATT grew into
15 separate agreements, the analytical approach to be followed
by panels did not likewise develop into 15 separate analytical
approaches. Rather, the analytical approach that WTO and
Appellate Body Secretariat staff adopt when advising panels and
the Appellate Body, respectively, stays largely faithful to GATT
first order principles that we will define below: namely, those
relating to market access, non-discrimination and necessity, all
buttressed by a skeptical attitude towards Members’ purported
justifications for the promulgation of ‘non-tariff barriers’, of
which environmental regulation formed an historically contentious subcategory.

IV. Domestic Regulation in the WTO
Below, I will compare and contrast GATT disciplines
relevant to environmental regulation from SPS and TBT disciplines. The following Section introduces GATT key disciplines,
alongside analogous SPS and TBT disciplines. It will seek to
underline the distinct analytical approach panels are meant to
adopt when resolving an SPS or TBT dispute.

1. The GATT94
Scope
The GATT applies, broadly, to any “measure” that nullifies
or impairs any of its benefit, or frustrates attainment of any of its
objectives.95 At a minimum, these measures include: “rules and
formalities in connection with importation or exportation”;96
“internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations
10

and requirements affecting the internal sale”;97 and measures
resulting in the “prohibitions or restrictions”,98 of products.99

Market Access
Market access under the GATT refers to the elimination of quantitative restrictions on goods. In the course of the
negotiations leading up to the Uruguay Round, WTO Members
had embarked upon a process of tariffication’ of ‘non-tariff ’
quantitative restrictions, particularly non-automatic import and
export licenses, and quotas. The GATT generally prohibits quantitative restrictions in form and effect.100 GATT tariff schedules
follow the World Customs Organization (WCO) Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).101 Current
practice allows Members some flexibility in how they subcategorize goods and service commitments in domestic law.102

Non-discrimination: National Treatment (NT)
NT prohibits WTO Members from treating imported products less favorably than “like” products. 103 This prohibition
applies to any measure adversely affecting imported products
in law or in fact. In determining whether a measure adversely
affects ‘like’ imported products, a WTO dispute panel will typically assess the extent to which the measure at issue has modified
the “conditions of competition” in favor of the ‘like’ domestic
product.104 In this context, likeness, is determined with respect
to the following four criteria: (a) product end-uses; (b) consumer
tastes and preferences; (c) physical characteristics; and (d) tariff
classifications.105

Non-discrimination: Most Favored Nation (MFN)
MFN prohibits WTO Members from treating imported products from some Members less favorably than “like” imported
products from other Members. Any “advantage”106 granted by a
Member must be accorded, unconditionally, to other Members,
whether or not these Members joined the WTO later by accession, and were thus not party to the original tariff or service
commitment negotiations.107 As with NT, MFN applies to measures affording an unfair advantage in law or in fact, unless such
measures were specifically exempted when commitments were
initially scheduled.108 Whenever such ‘advantage’ is established,
a violation of MFN is established with no additional inquiry into
the “conditions of competition” necessary.109 It bears mentioning that in the MFN context, likeness is understood to focus more
narrowly on physical characteristics and tariff classifications.

General Exemptions
WTO Members may derogate from the three principles
outlined above, whether for “security interests”,110 or by operation of the “general exemptions” clauses that allow Members to
impose trade restrictions “necessary” to protect stated objectives,
notably the protection of public morals, human, animal or plant
health, and/or to secure compliance with domestic laws or regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.111
The GATT also allows Members to impose restrictions “related
to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, where
made effective with reductions in domestic consumption.112
In all instances, Members must satisfy the requirements of the
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so-called “chapeau” which requires that the measures at issue
are “not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade”.113 These standards impart meaning to
one another, and seek to filter out foreseeable discrimination
in the application of a measure, as distinct from inadvertent or
unavoidable discrimination.114
In disputes where the disputing Members are party to
international law instruments bearing upon any of the relevant
exemptions, dispute panels and the Appellate Body have shown
a greater willingness to consider these instruments as satisfying
the chapeau.115 However, the precise status of non-WTO treaties
in dispute settlement is unsettled. While the Appellate Body has
shown itself willing to consider the terms of such treaties where
the disputing parties are signatories as relevant interpretive context,116 in other disputes it has refused to consider the relevance
of those treaties that fail to reflect the “common intention of all
parties”117 . This sets a high bar, particularly when one considers
that the WTO membership counts certain separate customs territories that are otherwise unrecognized under international law.

allowing Members to pursue any “legitimate objectives”, which
a panel must assess against the “risks non-fulfillment would create.”128 An important distinction is that while the GATT general
exemptions clause is, by its terms, an affirmative defense for a
respondent Member to invoke to show that its contested measures were “necessary” to achieve a stated objective, the SPS
and TBT Agreements frame the necessity requirement as an
obligation of the complainant.129
Importantly, both Agreements go beyond the GATT general
exemptions clause in requiring Members to adopt standards that
are “not more trade-restrictive than necessary”.130 These common provisions contemplate that an SPS or TBT measure can
be found to violate WTO law even if they do not discriminate,
in law or in fact, against imports. Specifically, they can be found
to be WTO-inconsistent if a less trade-restrictive measure is
available. Such measure must be both technically and economically feasible to implement, and achieve the respondent’s stated
level of protection. This proportionality standard thus embodies
a “post-discrimination” standard, which extends the reach of
the SPS and TBT Agreements beyond the reach of GATT nondiscrimination principles.131

2. SPS & TBT

Harmonization and the role of

Scope
The SPS Agreement applies to all “laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures”118 bearing on human, animal or plant health risk regulation; sanitary matters arising from
the risks of entry, establishment and spread of pests, diseases
or disease-causing organisms or from additives, contaminants or
toxins in food and feedstuffs; and pest-related damages. Given
that these operate as a ‘carve out’ from the TBT Agreement,
SPS measures should be narrowly defined.119 Nevertheless, SPS
measures have sometimes been interpreted widely to apply to
the regulation of GMOs and crossbreeds, as ‘pests.’120
The TBT Agreement defines a technical regulation as any
“document” which lays down “product characteristics or their
related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.”121 Whether a measure is a technical regulation will turn on
the extent to which it lays down “product characteristics.”122 A full
or partial import ban can constitute a technical regulation.123
The default rule is that SPS and TBT Agreements operate
in mutual exclusion: they cannot apply to the same element of a
measure.124 In theory, however, they can apply to different elements of the same measure. 125

Necessity Test & Post-Discrimination
Proportionality Standard
The SPS and TBT Agreements both refer to the GATT general exemptions clause in their preambles.126 Both agreements
further the objectives of the GATT in the realm of product standards. The SPS Agreement, by its terms, authorizes Members to
adopt only those measures necessary to protect human, animal
or plant health, provided they are backed by “sufficient scientific
evidence”.127 The TBT Agreement is broader than the GATT in
Fall 2016

international standards

The SPS and TBT Agreements encourage Members to
harmonize standards.132 To incentivize Members to harmonize
on a broad basis, the agreements afford safe harbor to standards
that are “based on” relevant international standards.133 The
agreements differ on the parameters of this safe harbor. The SPS
Agreement deems all domestic regulation “in conformity with”
existing international standards to pass the necessity test, and
presumes them to be consistent with the WTO Agreements as a
whole.134 The TBT Agreement requires Members to use existing
international standards “as a basis” for their technical regulations, unless such standards are “an inappropriate or ineffective
means to achieve” their legitimate objectives.135 However, the
TBT Agreement presumes all conforming measures to be consistent only with its terms, and not, for instance, with the GATT.
The SPS Agreement defines “international standards”
restrictively as those adopted under the aegis of the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention
(IPPC).136 Under the TBT Agreement, on the other hand, whether
a standard qualifies as an “international standard” turns on an
enquiry of the issuing “international standardization body”,
which must be a body with recognized activities in standardization, whose membership is open to at least all WTO Members.137
Neither the SPS nor the TBT Agreement requires qualifying
standards to be adopted by consensus. This seems to confer on
relevant international bodies some quasi-legislative status under
the WTO.138

Less favorable treatment (NT & MFN)
The SPS and TBT Agreements both contain combined references to MFN and NT. The SPS Agreement requires Members
to adopt measures that do not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably
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discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that
of other Members.”139 Similarly, the TBT Agreement requires
“treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products
of national origin and to like products originating in any other
country”.140
It is recalled that SPS standards protect living organisms
from pests or diseases in foodstuffs. SPS measures are thus tailored to specific risks, expressed, in terms of a Member’s stated
level of protection. This level of protection is typically gauged in
terms of the residual risk that remains following implementation
of an SPS measure.141 Depending on how low the residual risk
is set, an SPS measure can affect a range of products even in the
absence of any competitive situations. Likeness under the SPS
Agreement is thus assessed in relation to the levels of residual
risks set in analogous situations, which in essence focuses on
the regulatory purposes behind SPS measures.142 In practice,
likeness is nary a live issue in in SPS disputes — rather, it tends
to be assumed, for the reason that no respondent Member will
want to argue that the risks posed by the underlying imported
goods are unrelated to the risks redressed by its contested measure. Though literature is sparse on this point, it is submitted that
doing so would likely signal the absence of any SPS-compliant
justification for the resulting market access restriction, and thus
result in an admission of a GATT violation.
TBT product standards can also apply to analogously
wide product groups, for instance in relation to carcinogen
warning labels. It can thus be argued that the “like” product in
both agreements should also be assessed primarily against the
regulatory purpose of the relevant measure.143 This becomes
particularly compelling if we recall that the same measure can
have divisible SPS and TBT components:144 to assess the SPS
component of this measure as applying to a product group differing in scope from the TBT component of the same measure
would be anomalous. Yet, panels have been instructed by the
Appellate Body to approach likeness under the TBT Agreement
primarily with reference to the four GATT competitive relations
factors.145 As I will discuss below in my discussion of Appellate
Body jurisprudence, an inquiry into regulatory purpose under
the TBT has been limited to a non-discrimination analysis of
“even-handedness” between imported and domestic products (a
concept borrowed from the GATT chapeau).146

V. The Appellate Body’s Guide to
WTO-Consistent Domestic Regulation
The sequencing of an SPS/TBT analysis differs from that of
a GATT analysis. Whereas a GATT panel will first assess whether
there is a market access or non-discrimination violation, followed
by consideration of the necessity justifications put forward by the
respondent Member, a proper SPS/TBT analysis should proceed
in the reverse order. This is because both agreements presume,
to some degree, that domestic regulation will distort trade. Such
sequencing, further, stays faithful to the object and purpose of the
SPS and TBT Agreements, which, it is recalled, are elaborations
of the GATT’s ‘general exemptions’ clause.
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Under this approach, a complainant Member should first
substantiate its claim that a respondent Member’s SPS or TBT
measure is not necessary to achieve its stated purpose, through
identification of a lesser trade-restrictive alternative measure,
with those alternative measures conforming to a relevant international standard being the most compelling. Importantly, it is
incumbent on the complainant Member to make its case, by satisfying applicable rules on the burden of proof.147 Only when it
does so should the respondent Member provide justifications for
the contested measure, including rebutting the appropriateness
of any suggested alternative measures proffered by the complainant Member. A SPS or TBT panel should first consider the
necessity of the contested measure as a threshold issue, before
assessing whether or to what extent the measure accords less
favorable treatment to imports. Importantly, beyond an assessment of necessity, the DSU does not authorize panels to evaluate
the appropriateness of the contested measure in the abstract.
They may only do so where they determine that the complainant
Member has made a prima facie showing of WTO-inconsistency.
Where a contested SPS or TBT measure is not necessary, moreover, no further enquiry into less favorable treatment, discriminatory or otherwise, is warranted. Its trade-restrictive impacts
become disproportionate, notwithstanding this further enquiry.
Below, after summarizing the Appellate Body’s GATT
analysis, I will show that, in spite of the important distinctions
summarized above, the Appellate Body’s SPS analysis has
ignored proportionality altogether. The Appellate Body’s TBT
analysis, further, not only ignores the proportionality standard:
it ignores the proper sequencing of a TBT dispute and is, effectively, tainted by the wholesale importation of material elements
of the Appellate Body’s conventional GATT analysis.

1. GATT
Building upon decades of GATT jurisprudence, environmental regulation resulting in a complete or partial ban on imports are
almost mechanically found to violate GATT provisions on MFN,
NT and/or market access, except in those circumstances where the
“likeness” between imported and domestic products is less clearcut.148 In those instances, a close analysis of physical characteristics, and tariff classifications (in addition to product end-uses and
consumer tastes and preferences, in the NT context) may compel
a panel to find no violation, on the basis that the products at issue
are not alike. In a typical GATT dispute, however, framing a violation as a quantitative restriction, such as a full or partial import
ban, or regulatory discrimination through establishing likeness
under NT or MFN, and subsequent treatment less favorable, is
straightforward for a complainant Member.

Necessity
In such disputes, the final outcome will normally hinge on
whether such regulation can satisfy both limbs of the necessity
analysis contained in the ‘general exemptions’ clause. This clause
requires, first, that there be a nexus between the measure and the
stated objective and, second, that the measure passes the ‘chapeau’
test of even-handed application. The nexus under the first limb is
expressed either in terms of a “necessity” threshold, where the
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stated objective relates to the protection of public morals, human,
animal or plant health, or to secure compliance with domestic
laws or regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the WTO
Agreements, or as a “related to” threshold for the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources. Such natural resources have been
interpreted, broadly, to apply to “clean air”149 and sea turtles.150
“Necessity” is a tougher threshold to meet than “related to”. It
requires a “material” contribution to the achievement of the stated
objective.151 In an assessment of this nexus, “the contribution of
the measure has to be weighed against its trade restrictiveness,
taking into account the importance of the interests of the values
underlying the objective pursued”.152 An assessment of measures
“related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, in
contrast, hinges on a “close and genuine relationship of ends and
means.”153 Typically, respondent Members have not faced difficulties meeting either relational threshold.

The Chapeau: even-handedness and its limits
Respondent Members have fared worse under the chapeau
test. The chapeau, it is recalled, filters out discrimination in the
way that the contested measure is applied. It addresses a form of
discrimination that is unrelated to the violation of, for instance,
MFN or NT.154 The chapeau has been met successfully in one
dispute to date, involving US sea turtle conservation measures
restricting the sale of imported shrimp products.155 In the original
proceedings, the Appellate Body found elements of “unjustifiable
discrimination” in the conservation measures, for allowing certain Members longer grace periods to adapt to the measures than
others,156 and “arbitrary discrimination” in the manner in which
certification decisions under the measures were undertaken with
respect to certain Members with zero to comparatively low accidental takings of sea turtles.157 More broadly, the Appellate Body
was critical of the failure by the US to engage in “serious, acrossthe-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral
or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of
sea turtles” before “enforcing the import prohibition against the
shrimp exports of those other Members.”158
In ensuing compliance proceedings, the US streamlined its
certification process and engaged in bilateral and regional sea turtle conservation negotiations, while maintaining an import ban on
South Asian shrimp. Malaysia, one of the principal complainants,
argued that the US was obliged to successfully conclude negotiations prior to maintaining its measures. The Appellate Body disagreed, finding that such a requirement had no basis in the GATT
or chapeau.159 The US effectively pushed the Appellate Body’s
reasoning to its natural limits, by complying with the Appellate
Body by removing all discriminatory and arbitrary aspects of its
impugned conservation measures. Once it did so, the Appellate
Body had little choice but to accept that the US had complied with
its earlier recommendations, at the risk of otherwise adding an
onerous and ultra vires requirement that states conclude negotiations before they can meet the chapeau test.160
Since these proceedings, complainant Members have
stopped litigating environmental measures primarily under the
GATT — possibly for fear that the Appellate Body had revealed
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a blueprint for evading GATT chapeau disciplines. They have
turned instead to the SPS and TBT Agreements. In more recent
years, GATT claims have featured as subsidiary claims that are
only assessed in those rare instances where contested measures
fall outside the broad scope of the SPS and TBT Agreements.161

Assessment
Under the GATT, panels must first determine whether there
has been a substantive treaty violation. If a panel finds a violation, the environmental regulation’s compliance with the WTO
standard will depend on whether the respondent Member can
demonstrate that the regulation is applied even-handedly between
different Members, and between imports and like domestic
products. Such a finding, coupled with good faith negotiations
that achieve an international consensus on the underlying policy
objective, can clear the chapeau hurdle.162

2. SPS
The narrow definition of an SPS measure suggests that the
SPS Agreement was not designed to apply to environmental
regulation per se, but rather to a subset of food and feed regulation.163 That said, the SPS Agreement can apply, and indeed
has applied, more broadly to those environmental risks that are
regulated by WTO Members as a food and feed regulation. This
has been the case with the EU and its legal frameworks for hormones and GMOs.164
Where SPS disciplines apply and the complainant Member
has made a prima facie showing of inconsistency with a provision of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body begins with an
assessment of the measure’s necessity. Necessity can be demonstrated by a respondent Member in two ways. First, where an
SPS measure conforms to a qualifying international standard. It
is recalled, in this respect, that the SPS recognizes a closed list of
qualifying international bodies.165 Second, Members can diverge
from international standards and satisfy necessity by showing
that the measure is “based on” a scientific justification or a risk
assessment.166

No clear guidelines on the proportionality standard
Most SPS disputes on environmental regulation to date
have focused on this second avenue. Factors relevant to conducting the required risk assessment include: “relevant inspection,
sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases
or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or other
treatment.”167 Appellate Body decisions on these cases have
highlighted two features. First, such Members may factor sociopolitical considerations into their risk assessments. This is surprising, as such considerations logically feature more naturally
in risk management, an altogether separate inquiry. Risk management, while not expressly addressed in the SPS Agreement,
finds some expression in those provisions on a Member’s stated
or desired regulatory level of protection.168 Second, while general WTO transparency-related considerations require that a
WTO Member’s stated or desired regulatory level of protection
be sufficiently discernible from surrounding circumstances, the
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Appellate Body has accepted, somewhat counter-intuitively, that
ambiguities in defining their level of protection may actually
insulate respondent Members from a finding that a less traderestrictive alternative measure exists.169 These two factors may
suggest that the Appellate Body has blunted the application of
the proportionality standard to its SPS analysis.

Even-handedness: no limits
I predicate that the Appellate Body’s findings on a Member’s
level of protection may have blunted the application of the proportionality standard as the Appellate Body has never actually
moved far enough along in its SPS analyses to apply it. Instead,
it has incorporated into its necessity assessment a requirement
that panels assess the even-handedness of an SPS measure in
a manner analogous to that required under the first limb of the
GATT necessity analysis. While meeting the relational threshold
is easy for respondent Members in a GATT dispute, in the SPS
context it calls upon respondent Members to adduce clear scientific evidence. Where the adduced by the respondent Member
is ambiguous, panels will actively solicit the views of experts
on the proper application of SPS measures.170 These experts,
in turn, have provided assessments that panels have, at times,
cherry-picked from to question the merits of the underlying scientific basis for a contested measure, and the reasoning of the
risk assessor based on the available science.171 The Appellate
Body has regularly upheld panels’ factual determination that
the respondent’s scientific justifications in a given dispute have
been found lacking, either due to the lack of specificity of
studies relied upon172 or ambiguities as between the scientific
conclusions and the SPS measure, or the SPS measure and the
respondents’ stated levels of protection.173 The Appellate Body
has done so, while accepting that Members’ may base their SPS
measures on non-mainstream science.174

Assessment
Under the SPS Agreement, the WTO-consistency of environmental regulation, surprisingly, does not hinge on a proportionality standard. This is odd, given the possibility that Members
have of basing SPS measures on a range of non-mainstream
or majority science.175 Such a standard would have required a
complainant Member to establish that the respondent Member’s
environmental regulation is more trade restrictive than necessary
to achieve the respondent Member’s stated level of protection.
Instead, the Appellate Body has directed that environmental regulation be first assessed against a searching necessity analysis,
culminating in an examination of the relational nexus between
contested measure and stated objective based on the first limb
of a GATT necessity analysis. This examination assesses a measure’s relational links to underlying scientific justification, and
the respondent Member’s stated level of protection. All other
things being equal, such a heightened necessity analysis will
tend to disfavor the respondent Member, in prompting it to show
that its measure meets a scientific certainty test in a manner that,
effectively, relieves the complainant Member of any obligation to
show a reasonable alternative measure in the course of proceedings. Ironically, while this favors the complainant Member in the
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short term, it works to its disadvantage in the medium to long
term, inasmuch as the lack of any readily identifiable reasonable
alternatives creates ambiguities in compliance proceedings that
can be exploited by the respondent Member.176
It bears mentioning that the lack of environmental disputes
litigated under the SPS Agreement since issuance of a panel report
on GMOs bears possible testimony to the over-stringency of SPS
disciplines. While evidence on this point is anecdotal, respondent
Members seem to prefer framing environmental regulation as TBT
measures rather than SPS measures.177 Complainant Members,
for reasons I will elaborate upon below, are only too happy to base
their claims under the TBT Agreement.

3. TBT
It bears noting at the outset that, while the Appellate
Body has drawn a relatively clear line between environmental
regulations regulated by the SPS Agreement as distinct from the
GATT,178 precisely where the line is drawn between an environmental regulation that is a TBT technical regulation as distinct
from a GATT measure is currently an open question.179 This
is exacerbated by the lack of any clear guidance on whether a
measure deemed consistent with one preempts a violation of the
other.180 It bears emphasizing that such ambiguities would have
been avoided altogether if the Appellate Body had followed its
SPS sequencing, and reversed its TBT analysis to first analyze
the necessity of the TBT measure. This would have allowed the
Appellate Body, where a contested measure is alleged to violate
both the GATT and TBT Agreements, to begin a TBT analysis
where its GATT analysis closes.
Be that as it may, current ambiguities allow a complainant
Member to frame GATT challenges to environmental regulations under the [slightly] more stringent disciplines of the TBT
Agreement. In this vein, the Appellate Body recently disposed
of a spike of TBT appeals on a US ban on clove cigarettes, a US
dolphin conservation measures restricting the sale of imported
tuna products, US country of origin labeling requirements for
imported meat products, and an EU restriction on seal fur and
other byproducts181.

The GATT approach yields its limits
The Appellate Body’s TBT analysis, as mentioned above,
does not begin with a necessity analysis. Instead, the Appellate
Body reverted in its recent TBT decisions to its GATT analysis.
It thus starts its enquiry with a determination of product likeness, and an assessment of whether the contested measure treats
imported products less favorably than like imported or domestic
products. Likeness, in this context, does not follow an SPS-type
analysis of regulatory purpose, but rather mirrors GATT-type
competitive relations factors.182 Where less favorable treatment
is established, the Appellate Body directs additional enquiry
into whether this treatment “stems exclusively from legitimate
regulatory distinctions.”183 This additional enquiry, which finds
no textual basis in the TBT Agreement, draws upon elements of
the GATT NT and chapeau provisions, and requires a respondent
Member to show that its measure is properly “calibrated” to the
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risks it seeks to mitigate.184 In practice, all TBT measures to date
have failed this amorphous ‘calibration’ test.
In a development that parallels the above-cited GATT
dispute concerning US sea turtle conservation measures, however, the Appellate Body’s most recent TBT decision, issued in
end-November 2015, saw the US come within paragraphs of
passing the ‘calibration’ test in recourse proceedings relating
to the latest installment of the dolphin conservation measures
that had so troubled GATT panel over two decades earlier. In the
original proceedings, the US measure had been found to subject
tuna harvesters within the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP) to less
onerous certification requirements than tuna harvesters outside
the ETP, despite both groups of harvesters posing equal risks
to dolphin populations.185 The US had amended its measure
to require additional certification outside the ETP in situations
involving the existence of “regular and significant association
between dolphins and tuna”, but not upon existence of “regular
and significant mortality or serious injury of dolphins”. The
Appellate Body found that this regulatory distinction reflected a
lack of even-handedness, inasmuch as the risks to dolphins from
both situations was comparable.186
While the US lost the appeal, it can comply with the
Appellate Body’s ruling through cosmetic amendment to its
certification requirements, which the Appellate Body will be
precedent-bound to ratify as TBT consistent in any follow-up
compliance proceedings. Having zeroed in on the Appellate
Body’s GATT-style legal analysis, the US, as it did in the abovereferenced shrimp dispute again pushed the Appellate Body to
the limits of its non-discrimination analysis, by chipping away at
all but one of those aspects of its conservation measures that the
Appellate Body had deemed improperly ‘calibrated’. Had the
Appellate Body steered closer to the text of the TBT Agreement,
by focusing less on discrimination (as there was none present)
and more on the feasibility of lesser trade-restrictive alternatives,
it could have availed itself of some of the lesser trade-restrictive
alternative measures proposed by the complainant, Mexico, to
strike down the US measure on other grounds. As I will elaborate
upon below, however, the Appellate Body has instead elected to
distance itself from the proportionality standard in TBT case law.

The better analytical approach
Pursuant to an SPS-type analysis, which it at one stage
seemed to follow in earlier TBT disputes,187 the Appellate Body
should have started its enquiry with a necessity analysis, either
by examining relevant international standards cited by the complainant, or by assessing the extent to which the measure at issue
is based on a legitimate objective.
Most TBT disputes have focused on the relevance of an
existing international standard. A complainant Member here
must do more than show that a relevant standard exists. It must
also show that the standard is “appropriate” and/or “effective”
to achieve the respondent Member’s legitimate objective.188 A
respondent Member could challenge the standard on the basis
of climactic particularities or technology gaps, or because it
aspires to more stringent standards than the international
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standard — reflecting it’s stated or desired regulatory level of
protection in the TBT context.189
Were a Member to diverge from relevant international standards, it would need to satisfy a necessity standard, by showing, as required in an SPS analysis, that the measure is based
on a legitimate objective. The starting point in a panel’s analysis
here would not be the TBT provision addressing less favorable
treatment, teeing up the free-standing calibration test, but rather
the proportionality provision requiring Members to adopt TBT
measures that are the least restrictive to trade.190 No additional
enquiry into less favorable treatment should be required where
the measure at issue is deemed disproportionate.

Assessment
Under the TBT Agreement, the WTO-consistency of environmental regulation turns on the respondent Member’s satisfying a GATT chapeau-style even-handedness assessment. This is
because the Appellate Body has largely framed its TBT analysis
in the same terms as its GATT analysis. The result, it is submitted,
is the transformation of the TBT into a ‘GATT 2.0’, where the
burden of proof favors the complainant Member, and contested
measures are unlikely to survive the a freestanding ‘calibration’
test. Though this calibration test is no less exacting than the
even-handedness test applied in the SPS context, a potentially
infinite range of international standards and the absence of any
pervasive requirement to adduce supporting scientific justification seems to make litigating environmental regulation under the
TBT Agreement the more attractive of the three agreements for
complainant and respondent Members alike.
As with its SPS case law, the Appellate Body’s introduction, in its TBT jurisprudence of an even-handedness analysis
has blunted application of the proportionality standard. 191
Accordingly, the Appellate Body has been slow to accept less
restrictive alternative measures proposed by complainant
Members, where these find no basis in existing international
standards.192 It has instead shown total deference to respondent
Members’ stated or desired regulatory levels of protection. Where
proposed alternatives fail to achieve these stated levels, however
artfully or fancifully expressed, the contested measure cannot be
considered more trade-restrictive than necessary. Thus, in one of
the rare cases where the Appellate Body addressed an alternative
measure — albeit one based on an international standard — it
reversed the panel’s findings to hold that Mexico’s proposal that
a tuna label certifying that no dolphins were killed by harvesting methods fell short of the broader US concern that dolphins
not be harmed by these methods.193 Though these objectives
were unquestionably different, there was surely some common
ground between both sets of objectives for the Appellate Body
to maneuver to identify a suitable compromise measure on the
record before it.
Under my proposed analytical approach, the US’ stated
level of protection would have been subject to a more searching
assessment,194 where a panel would have weighed the contested
certification requirement against a range of other possible alternative measures adduced by Mexico. Were the US’ certification
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requirement to yield disproportionate trade-restrictive impacts,
this would not necessarily be the end of the matter:195 assuming
the respondent Member puts forward a plausible justification for
the necessity of the trade-restrictive impacts, the WTO inconsistency of the measure would hinge on the existence of an equally
efficient yet less trade restrictive alternative. If a complainant
Member could establish the viability of such an alternative,
the contested measure would be deemed WTO-inconsistent.
Otherwise, the respondent Member should be presumed to be
acting in a WTO-consistent manner. This analysis would be more
accommodating to the concerns addressed in the United States’
dolphin conservation measure, while staying more faithful to the
text of the TBT Agreement.196

VI. Conclusion
The Appellate Body, through adherence to uniform GATT
cannons of interpretation, has belied the lack of internal coherence in the various WTO Agreements. In so doing, it has
succeeded in maintaining rigid limits on Members’ abilities
to lawfully circumvent any and all WTO treaty obligations.
Laudable as this may be, given the WTO’s recent struggles to
push anything meaningful through its negotiating pillar as of late,
the problem is that the Appellate Body has not acted pursuant
to any clear mandate from the WTO membership. Some would
argue that this unbridled judicial activism may have recently
caught up with the Appellate Body, following the US’ decision
to block re-appointments of sitting Appellate Body members
that it deemed had failed to properly execute their functions in
the course of their first term, notably due to their ‘questionable’
stance on aspects of US trade remedies legislation.197 Though
this impasse was eventually crossed after months of internal
tussles in the DSB,198 the timing is ripe to rethink the Appellate
Body’s approach to WTO dispute settlement.
When reviewing the above jurisprudence on environmental
regulation, we see that the Appellate Body has imported key
elements of its GATT necessity analysis into its SPS and TBT
jurisprudence. In its SPS case law, the most critical analytical
element, the assessment of the relational nexus between the
contested measure and the stated objective, is lifted from the
first limb of the Appellate Body’s GATT necessity analysis. Case
law has yet to reveal whether the second limb will feature in an
SPS analysis. Similarly, in its TBT case law, which otherwise
replicates the Appellate Body’s GATT analysis in full, the most
critical analytical element, the assessment of a contested measure’s ‘calibration’, draws from the second limb of the Appellate
Body’s GATT necessity analysis. No analysis of the first limb
precedes this calibration test. It is curious that the Appellate
Body has ostensibly severed the GATT necessity analysis
between the two agreements in such a manner. Moreover, while
the Appellate Body seems to follow proper sequencing in its SPS
rulings, by starting with a necessity analysis before, presumably,
following through with a proportionality assessment, it does
not do so in its TBT rulings. This is surprising, given that the
TBT Agreement is structured much more closely with the SPS
Agreement, and should be identified more closely with the latter.
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The Appellate Body has thus narrowed the scope of the SPS
and TBT Agreements, effectively aligning them with GATT-type
market access, non-discrimination and necessity principles.
Doing so, however, has yielded some unintended consequences:
chief among them being that it becomes difficult to demarcate
precisely where a GATT analysis ends and a TBT analysis
begins. It would seem that a technical regulation under the GATT
is anything short of a product ban that fails to lay down any
discernible “product characteristics.”199 In this sense, the TBT
Agreement does not seem to apply as holistically to quantitative
restrictions. Further, the TBT Agreement allows Members to
pursue an open-ended list of “legitimate objectives”. Members
seeking to legislate for objectives beyond those enumerated in
the GATT ‘general exemptions’ clause will thus continue to avail
themselves of the ability to do so under the TBT Agreement.
These factors, however, represent the ‘outer limits’ of the
GATT and the TBT Agreement. How the Appellate Body will
handle a conflict between GATT and TBT disciplines where they
overlap becomes unclear. One can fathom of a situation where
a complainant Member challenges a measure that the respondent Member seeks to justify with reference to a TBT-consistent
objective that is not listed under the GATT general exemptions
clause; or, where such complainant Member challenges the
relevance of an international standard cited by the respondent
Member to benefit from the TBT Agreement’s ‘safe harbor’ in a
GATT complaint, where a measure’s purported compliance with
international obligations may not insulate it from challenge. Had
the Appellate Body stayed more faithful to the text of the TBT
Agreement, it would have avoided teeing up such a potentially
significant legal conflicts.
While it is true that the SPS and TBT Agreements seek to
extend the application of GATT ‘general exemptions’ principles
to product standards, both are meant to go well beyond conventional GATT market access and non-discrimination disciplines.
A key feature of this extension lies in the obligation common to
both the agreements that measures not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary. This common obligation invites WTO panels to
assess the proportionality of a measure, and requires respondent Members to adopt feasible and less restrictive alternative
measures, where such measures have been identified clearly by
complainants. The Appellate Body has distanced itself from this
proportionality standard, perhaps because it represents a concept
relatively alien to a GATT analysis. Unfortunately, the use of and
abuse of GATT principles in SPS and TBT case law has yielded
a more intrusive analysis than that contemplated by the SPS
and TBT Agreement drafters. This comes at a significant cost:
environmental regulations with trade-distorting effects tend to
be struck down for the very reason that they distort trade. This
is tautological. Inasmuch as the Appellate Body has elected to
avoid applying proportionality standards by affording a good
measure of deference to a respondent Member’s stated or desired
regulatory level of protection, such deference matters not where
panels consistently find that contested measures fail to satisfy
a necessity analysis. These Members would surely prefer having their environmental objectives preserved, even if a more
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searching enquiry into the existence of a viable alternative
requires them to amend certain aspects of their regulations.
Taking a step back, it cannot be said that the Appellate
Body’s struggle to properly analyze environmental regulation
is supported by any of the theories outlined in Section II. The
Appellate Body has not reverted to first order GATT principles
as a means to either blunt or embrace the DSU’s expansive jurisdiction, or because there is a fundamental conflict between WTO
obligations and international environmental law obligations.
Indeed, the Appellate Body has previously sanctioned the use of
trade-distorting environmental conservation measures in prior
rulings without destabilizing the global trade regime. Rather, I
have sought to show that first order GATT principles, which are
ingrained in the WTO’s institutional memory, filter through to
WTO and Appellate Body dispute settlement reports.

Possible reform initiatives
Human Resources
WTO and Appellate Body Secretariat staff are trained to
detect circumvention of tariff bindings, in breach of non-discrimination and market access principles. They are conditioned
to treat stated justifications for these breaches with a healthy
dose of skepticism. These staff, in turn, can regularly influence
the legal analysis contained in panel or Appellate Body reports.
That WTO panel and Appellate Body reports reveals a high level
of comfort with the “belt and braces” disputes on market access
restriction, while openly struggling with the precise contours of
the GATT, SPS and TBT agreements, would suggest that those
very skills that make a legal officer adept at dispensing with
highly technical aspects of a dumping or countervailing duty
investigation do not lend themselves easily to an environmental regulation dispute. These latter disputes cannot be resolved
in a technical vacuum, at the expense of fully appreciating the

myriad scientific nuances and fine political balancing embodied
in environmental regulation. There is no easy fix to this problem.
Moving forward, a more diversified pool of legal officers, featuring individuals with stronger science and environmental studies
training, may offer fresher perspectives yielding more cohesive
WTO trade and environment dispute reports.

Authoritative Interpretations
Beyond human resource reforms, I have already that the US
has sought to rectify the balance of power within the WTO by
refusing to sign off on Appellate Body member reappointments.
Curbing the Appellate Body’s legislative prerogative by way
of authoritative interpretations represents a more democratic
reform initiative. Problematically, such interpretations are nearly
impossible to pass for the same reason that the US is vested with
a de facto block on Appellate Body member staffing: institutional voting requirements favor decisions taken by consensus.
Reaching consensus on anything these days is a tall order now
that the WTO counts upwards of 164 Members.

In-dispute safe harbors
One final reform initiative that may prove be easier
to implement lies in the ‘safe harbor’ provisions of the SPS
and TBT Agreements for standards conforming to qualifying
international standards. Members seeking to reach meaningful agreements on environmental regulation need not be held
hostage by either a rampant Appellate Body or the looming
collapse of the WTO negotiations pillar. A critical mass can
come together to promulgate qualifying international standards
in international organizations outside the WTO legal framework, which may subsequently be relied upon in disputes as
presumptively valid. The WTO domestic regulation disputes of
the future may well focus on the contours of qualifying international standard bodies.
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83
See How are disputes settled?, at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (providing the discussion on a plenary meeting of
the WTO’s membership, essentially wearing a different hat).
84
See DSU Art. 22.6 (explaining where the parties disagree on the level of
retaliation proposed by the winning Member (which always occurs), the Members will refer the matter to WTO arbitration).
Such proceedings should last no more than 60 days. Id. However, in a typical case, the losing respondent Member will make cosmetic amendments
to the offending measure(s) and argue that it has, in fact, complied with
the DSB’s recommendations. Id.; see also DSU Art. 21.5 (explaining the
process a complainant Member must follow when where the complainant Member disagrees). The 21.5 proceedings should ideally be disposed
of before 22.6 proceedings are initiated — typically by way of so-called
“sequencing” agreements owing to some unfortunate ambiguity in the DSU
on this matter. Id.; see e.g., Thibault Fresquet et al., Retaliation under the
WTO system: When does Nullification or Impairment Begin?, Graduate
Institute of Int’l & Dev. Studies Trade Law Clinic Paper, 6-12 (2011)
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http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/
Law%20Clinic/Memoranda%202011/Memo-Retaliation_under_the_WTO.
pdf (summarizing “sequencing” agreements).
85
See DSU Art. 22.2.
86
Such retaliation may target goods other than those subject to the dispute,
and may implicate the suspension of obligations in other WTO Agreements. See
Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, p. 5663, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted
20 April 2005) (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475) (hereinafter United
States — Gambling) http://www.ip-watch.org/2016/11/28/antigua-barbuda-liftus-ip-protection-2017-us-fails-comply-wto-ruling/ (demonstrating the notable
Antigua & Barbuda’s recent promise to act upon prior threats to lift intellectual
property protection on United States goods if the latter fails to comply with the
adverse panel and Appellate Body decision in Appellate Body Report, United
States –Gambling).
87
See DSU Art. 23.1.
88
See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13
Eur. J. Int’l L. 753, 767 (2002). (explaining how WTO panels are arguably
prevented by other provisions of the DSU, notably Arts. 3(2) and 7, from making any findings on non-WTO law and that such non-WTO law, it is argued can,
at best, be raised as a defense to the non-adherence to WTO obligations); see
also Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How
Far Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535, 535 (2001); see also David Palmeter
& Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 Am. Journal
of Int’l Law 399, 399 (1998); but see T. Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform, 47 Int’l & Comp. L. Quarterly,
653 (2000) (explaining a different view, in which the DSU contains “implied
powers” for panels to adjudicate beyond the Covered Agreements); see contra
Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on
Non-World Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merits, 37
J. World Trade 1005-19 (2003) (taking a middle ground in a later — identifying the possibility for a panel to decline jurisdiction in favor of non-WTO law
as an alternative to making findings on non-WTO law).
89
See Eric.A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication, University of California, Berkeley Law School (Boalt Hall) Public Law
and Legal Research Paper Series Research Paper, 126, 24-27 (2004) (noting
that compliance “can be measured in terms of compliance rate: the number of
complied-with judgments divided by the total number of judgments,” whereas
usage “can be measured in gross terms or in more refined terms).
Budget is relevant as “States can starve tribunals that they do not like by
denying them funds.” Id.; see e.g., M.L. Busch & E. Reinhardt, Transatlantic
Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in E.U. Petersmann &
M.A. Pollack, Transatlantic Economic Disputes: the EU, the US and the
WTO (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) (providing the study that
the authors rely on which explains that they are confined to EU-US trade
disputes for a proposition in which compliance was actually lower under the
WTO than under the GATT).
90
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement 88 (Kluwer Law International, Den Haag 1997).
91
See Kyung Kwak & Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction between the WTO and RTAs, WTO Conference on Regional Trade
Agreements, (Apr. 26, 2002), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
sem_april02_e/marceau.pdf.
92
Appellate Body Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, ¶ 105 WT/DS90/AB/R, (adopted
Sept. 22, 1999) (highlighting India’s argument, that “the drafters of the WTO
Agreement created a complex institutional structure under which various bodies
are empowered to take binding decisions on related matters). These bodies must
cooperate to achieve the objectives of the WTO, and can only do so if each
exercises its competence with due regard to the competence of all other bodies.
Id. In order to preserve a proper institutional balance between the judicial and
the political organs of the WTO with regard to matters relating to balance-ofpayments restrictions, review of the justification of such measures must be left
to the relevant political organs.”Id.
93
See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation:
Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 31 Int’l Lawyer 634 (1998) (stating that
“[t]ribunals usually call for such discretion when they are being asked to resolve
important issues under legal criteria that make little or no policy sense.”).
“The normal response of most tribunals to such a task is to decide the case
as best they can by making a seat-of-the-pants judgment about whether the
defendant government is behaving correctly or incorrectly- a process of
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judgment known in some circles as the ‘smell test.’ Once the tribunal comes
to a conclusion about who should win, it fashions an analysis, in terms of the
meaningless criteria it has been asked to apply, that makes the case comes
out that way. Given the likelihood that decisions written in this manner will
have a high degree of inconsistency, the tribunals naturally seek to give such
decisions as much armor-plating as possible by claiming the widest possible
range of discretion.” Id.
94
See P. Morrison & L. Nielsen, supra note 14, at 222-30. I will also refer,
in this section, to GATS rules, inasmuch as they may relate to environmental
protection measures. Consider, for instance, the prohibition on nationals seeking to hunt wild animals abroad. In this regard, given the paucity of GATS
jurisprudence beyond the US/Gambling dispute, which I will mention below, I
will largely confine my GATS discussion to footnotes.
95
See GATT art. XXIII:1(b).
96
GATT art. I:1.
97
GATT art. III:1.
98
GATT art. XI:1.
99
See also GATS art. I:1 (applying “measures by Members affecting trade in
services,” whether taken by central, regional or local government bodies, or by
non-government bodies in the exercise of officially delegated authority).
100 See GATT art. XI (articulating the “general elimination of quantitative
restrictions”); GATS art. XVI:2.
GATS art XVI:2 lists six forms of market access restrictions that Members
may not impose in a service sector unless exempted into their services commitments, including: maximum limits on the number of service suppliers;
value of service transactions; number of service operations allowed; and
natural persons that may be employed, measures restricting the types of legal
entity or joint venture, and limits on the participation of foreign capital,
whether expressed as a percentage or aggregate numerical value. See GATS
art XVI:2.
101 See generally International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (June 14, 1983) with HS Nomenclature
(2012), Hein’s No. KAV 2260, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/
nomenclature/instrument-and-tools/hs_nomenclature_2012/hs_nomenclature_table_2012.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (establishing pursuant to the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, the HS nomenclature, presently in its 2012 iteration); see also Note
by the WTO Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, WTO Doc. MTN.
GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991).
GATS service commitments follow the UN Provisional Central Product
Classification Code (CPC). See Statistical Paper, United Nations
Provisional Central Product Classification Code (CPC), Version 2.1, ¶ 85,
U.N. Statistical Paper ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M.77/Ver.2.1 (2015).
102 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, ¶¶ 30, 33, 42, WT/DS68/AB/R (adopted
Jun. 22, 1998) (holding that the panel correctly established that the U.S. sufficiently identified measures and products at issue when they identified to the
panel a general “product grouping of products” and are not required to identify
every sub grouping of those broad categories).
103 See GATT art. III:2 (drawing a distinction between “like” products and
“directly competitive and substitutable” products, which does not appear in
other WTO Agreements); see also GATS art. XVII (drawing a distinction
between like services and like service suppliers).
More fundamentally, for purposes of WTO dispute settlement, GATT’s
coverage is far more extensive than GATS, owing to an “agreement to disagree” in Uruguay Round negotiations that resulted in the positive listing
of GATS commitments relative to the negative listing of GATT commitments. See Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception:
Does it Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it Affect or is
Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ 281,
293-304 (1997). Where disputes involve hybrid goods, this distinction
becomes practically immaterial. See Panel Report, Canada — Certain
Measures Concerning Periodicals, ¶¶ 3.33, 5.19, WT/DS31/R (adopted 30
July 1997), see also Appellate Body Report, Canada — Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, ¶ 481, WT/DS31/AB/R, DSR (1997) (modifying
the Panel Decision where the panel and Appellate Body agreed that that the
applicability of the GATS to a mixed goods/service transaction, split-run
periodicals and advertisements, in that particular dispute, did not exclude
application of the GATT).
104 See GATT art. III:2 (mentioning competition explicitly as relevant whenever the impact of a measure is assessed against a “directly competitive and
substitutable” imported product and has been extended to the art. III:4 cases by
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the Appellate Body); see also GATS art. XVII:3 (asserting national treatment
for like services); see also Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 1-58, WT/DS161/AB/R (adopted
Jan. 10, 2001) (where the Appellate Body assessed the impact of a contested
measure on the ordinary channels of distribution ).
105 Note that under the GATS, likeness is primarily determined with reference
to the nature and characteristics of the service transactions. See Panel Report,
European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, 377, ¶ 7.322, WT/DS27/R/ECU (adopted
Sept. 25, 1997):
“the nature and the characteristics of wholesale transactions as such, as well
as of each of the different subordinated services mentioned in the headnote to section 6 of the CPC, are ‘like’ when supplied in connection with
wholesale services, irrespective of whether these services are supplied with
respect to bananas of EC and traditional ACP origin, on the one hand, or
with respect to bananas of third-country or non-traditional ACP origin, on
the other. Indeed, it seems that each of the different service activities taken
individually is virtually the same and can only be distinguished by referring
to the origin of the bananas in respect of which the service activity is being
performed. Similarly, in our view, to the extent that entities provide these
like services, they are like service suppliers.”.
106 See GATT art. I:1. “Advantages” most all effective purposes, are scheduled
MFN tariff or service concessions. See WTO, Goods Schedules: member commitments, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm
(providing access to MFN tariff schedules and service concessions).
107 A principle established decades ago by the the GATT Working Party Report
on the ‘Accession of Hungary.’ See L/3889, ¶ 12 (adopted Jul. 30, 1973) (interpreting language in GATT art. I:1 requiring any “advantage” to be accorded
“immediately and unconditionally” to other GATT Contracting Parties); see
also GATS art. II.
108 See GATT art. II (stating that obtaining temporary waivers can be sought
pursuant to GATT art. I, but note that these are in practice difficult to acquire);
see also GATS art. II (allowing Members to maintain exemptions, if listed in
the Annex on Article II); see also Annex on Article II Exemptions (containing
listed exemptions).
109 See GATT Panel Report, Canada/Japan — Tariff on Imports of Spruce,
Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, ¶ 20, L/6470 (adopted July 19, 1989)
(seemingly a departure from GATT 1947 principles).
110 GATT art. XXI; see also GATS art. XIV.
111 GATT art. XX(b); GATS art. XIV.
112 GATT art. XX(g).
113 GATT art. XX; GATS art. XIV (emphasis added).
114 See Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 28-29, WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996).
115 See e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 25, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6,
1998) (discussing the CITES Convention).
116 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting
the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R (adopted July
23,1998).
117 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, ¶ 250, WT/DS269/AB/R (adopted
Sept. 27, 2005); see generally H.J. Bourgeois, Jacques and Ravi Soopramanien,
The World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System: Embedded in Public
International Law?, In Carl Baudenbacher (Ed.), DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
311-49 (German Law Publishers, 2009) (providing a detailed analysis of the
conflicting case-law).
118 See SPS, Annex A.1.1 (stating that such measures include: “inter alia,
end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection,
certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant
requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the
materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant
statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and
packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety”).
119 See Jacqueline Peel, Scope of Application of the SPS Agreement: a PostBiotech Analysis, Research Handbook on Env’t, Health, & the WTO 332, 337
(Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost ed., Edward Elgar 2013).
120 Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, ¶¶ 7.226-.240, WT/DS293/R (adopted Nov.
29, 2006).

Fall 2016

121

TBT, Annex 1.1 (stating that such measures may “include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements
as they apply to a product, process, or production method.”).
122 See Appellate Body Reports, European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.58, WT/DS401/AB/R
(adopted June 18, 2014) (referencing a rare instance in which the Appellate
Body held that a ban on seal products that carved out exemptions relating to the
identity of the hunters did not set such product characteristics).
123 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, ¶¶ 75-77, WT/DS135/AB/R
(adopted Feb. 16, 2001) (finding that the full import ban of any product containing asbestos fibers as such is considered a technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT).
124 SPS, supra note 12, at art. 1.4; TBT, supra note 13, at art. 1.5.
125 Panel Report, EC/Biotech, supra note 123, at para 7.165.
This assumes that “the requirement [embodied in the measure] could be split
up into two separate requirements which would be identical to the requirement at issue, and which would have an autonomous raison d’être, i.e., a
different purpose which would provide an independent basis for imposing
the requirement.” Id.
126 TBT, supra note 13, at preamble ¶ 6 (“[r]ecognizing that no country
should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of
its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the
environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction
on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of
this Agreement.”); SPS, supra note 12, at preamble ¶ 1 (“[r]eaffirming that no
Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that
these measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.”).
127 SPS, supra note 12, at art. 2.2, 5.7 (stating that Members may, provisionally
adopt SPS measures on the basis of “available pertinent information,” which
may fall short of the default standard set in art. 2.2).
128 TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.2 (stating that an assessment of the risk nonfulfillment would create will normally turn on “inter alia: available scientific
and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses
of products”).
129 O. Cadot et al., Streamlining Non-Tariff Measures: A Toolkit for Policy
Makers, 27 (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2012).
130 TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.2; SPS, supra note 13, at arts. 2.2, 5.6.
131 See Appellate Body Report, Korea/Beef, supra note 107 (relating to
proportionality and the identification of a lesser restrictive alternative to a challenged measure); see also, Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 403-19 (2003) (providing a comprehensive account of the application of the lesser restrictive alternative standard in WTO and GATT disputes).
132 See generally TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.7 (“Members shall give positive
consideration to….”); SPS, supra note 12, at art. 4 (citing “Members shall
accept”). See also Marsha Echols, Equivalence and risk regulation under the
World Trade Organization’s SPS Agreement, Research Handbook on Env’t,
Health, & the WTO 79, 81-2 (Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost ed., Edward
Elgar 2013).
133 TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.5 (allowing for safe harbor also requires that
the standard be applied in connection to a “legitimate objective”); SPS supra
note 13, at art. 3.3.
134 Compare SPS, supra note 12, at art. 3.1 (basing measures on international
standards, do not benefit from this safe harbor) with SPS, supra note 12, at art.
3.2 (conforming with standards does benefit from the safe harbor).
The safe harbor insulating such measures from challenge under, for instance,
the GATT. No similar presumption applies with TBT measures, notably
because the TBT’s relationship with the GATT is uncertain. Id. I note, in
this respect, that measures deemed consistent with the TBT are not ‘carved
out’ from the GATT in the manner prescribed by SPS art. 2.4. As a so-called
“Annex 1A” Agreement, the TBT Agreement is deemed lex specialis to the
GATT pursuant to the General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A to the WTO
Charter. But this does not altogether exclude the GATT’s application, when
raised concurrently in a dispute. See Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10,
at 424-25.
135 TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.4.
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SPS, supra note 12, at annex A.3.
See Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 30-32, WT/
DS381/AB/R (adopted June 13, 2012) (illustrating the United State’s position
on how the AIDCP was not an international standardizing organization because
it is not international within the meaning of TBT, does not engage in standardizing activities and is not an organization, but a international agreement).
138 See European Communities — Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 223, WT/
DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) (explaining how standards adopted by
international bodies do not have to be by consensus); TBT; Codex Alimentarius
Commission, Procedural Manual–Rule XII 1, 17 (21st ed., 2013) (referencing
majority voting where no consensus is reached); SPS supra note 13; see also A.
Mattoo & P. Sauve, Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization 70
(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003).
139 SPS, supra note 12, at art. 2.3.
140 TBT, supra note 13, at art. 2.1.
141 Compare SPS, supra note 12, at annex A.5, with Jeffery Atik, On the
efficiency of health measures and the appropriate level of protection, Research
Handbook on Env’t, Health, & the WTO 116, 116-17 (Geert Van Calster &
Denise Prévost ed., Edward Elgar 2013) (explaining that a better measure would
pertain to the residual risk tolerated upon a measure’s implementation).
142 SPS, supra note at art. 5.5; See Panel Report, Australia — Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶ 8.115, WT/DS18/RW (adopted Mar. 20, 2000).
143 See Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 7.244, WT/DS406/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012)
(affirming that this was the view of the US/Clove Cigarette panel, which was
overturned by the Appellate Body); see Donald Regan, Regulatory purpose
in GATT Article III, TBT Article 2.1, the Subsidies Agreement, and elsewhere:
Hic et ubique, Research Handbook on Env’t, Health, & the WTO 41, 61-74
(Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost ed., Edward Elgar 2013) (criticizing, the
Appellate Body’s transposition of GATT likeness principles on TBT art. 2.1).
144 See EC/Biotech, supra note 123, at ¶ 7.381-.393 (citing “in the event that
the different elements could not be divided, the panel considered that the SPS
Agreement would control”); see text, at note 128.
145 Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 104, WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24,
2012). See text at notes 107-9 for the four criteria.
146 Appellate Body Report, United States — Certain Country of Origin
Labeling (COOL) Requirements, ¶ 293, WT/DS384/AB/R (adopted July 23,
2012); see also Gabrielle Marceau, The New TBT Jurisprudence in US — Clove
Cigarettes, WTO US — Tuna II, and US–COOL, 8 Asian J. of WTO & Int’l
Health L. & Pol’y 1, 12 (2013) (explaining that the Appellate Body likely did
so in an attempt “to preserve the balance of the TBT Agreement and its place in
the WTO Agreement as a whole....”
The Appellate Body went on to say that it also did so in an attempt to keep
the “Appellate Body’s explanation that the ‘balance’ of interests intended
by the drafters of the TBT Agreement between the right to regulate and the
reduction of unnecessary obstacles to trade must be found within Article
2.1.[....] [and] the approach allows the Appellate Body to make sense of the
fact that no GATT Article XX defense exists under the TBT Agreement and,
in particular, under the non-discrimination provisions of Article 2.1.”
147 See EC-Hormones, supra, note 33 (explaining the complainant’s duty to
establish a prima facie case).
148 See generally, Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Burden of Proof in
Environmental Disputes in the WTO: Legal Aspects, 18 Eur. Energy & Envtl.
L. Rev. 112, 112-40)ee, for instance, orld of InterToolkit for Policyg of WTO
legal obligations erminations,mportsMarch 27-28, 2008), at pp. 1-er p (2009)
(discussing the role of the burden of proof in establishing the constituent elements of a GATT violation, including notably that the imported and domestic
products at issue are alike).
149 See Appellate Body Report, US/Gasoline, supra note 117, at ¶ 29 (accepting that clean air is an exhaustible natural resource).
150 See Appellate Body Report, US/Shrimp, supra note 118, at ¶ 134 (accepting that sea turtles are exhaustible natural resources).
151 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 210, WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) (explaining
the relational nexus between the effects of a measure and its stated justification
needed to satisfy the GATT Article XX “necessity” standard).
152 See Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10, at 368, 373 (referencing the
debate as to whether recent GATT cases have dispensed with this proportionality standard).
137
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See Appellate Body Report, US/Shrimp, supra note 118 at ¶ 136 (explaining the relational nexus between the effects of a measure and its stated justification needed to satisfy the GATT Article XX “related to” standard).
154 See Appellate Body Report, US/Gasoline, supra note 117 at ¶ 29 (distinguishing between the violations of GATT Art. III and the GATT Art. XX
chapeau).
155 See EC/Asbestos, supra note 126 (meeting the chapeau, obiter).
156 Appellate Body Report, US/Shrimp, supra note 118, at ¶¶ 175-76.
157 Id. at ¶¶ 181-84.
158 Id. at ¶ 166 (illustrating that the Appellate Body makes this point in relation to “unjustifiable discrimination” although the unilateral nature of the US
measures informed much of the Appellate Body’s analysis of art. XX).
159 Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products — Recourse to article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia ¶ 124, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001, DSR 2001).
160 See Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau:
A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 739,
804-20 (2001) (arguing that the Appellate Body, in the original proceedings,
had effectively created a requirement to negotiate a multilateral regime in order
to pass the “unjustifiable discrimination” limb of the GATT Art. XX chapeau);
but see Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A
New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 Colum. J. Envtl.
L. 491, 508-9 (2002) (contending that the Appellate Body did not impose a selfstanding duty to negotiate separate from the broader obligation to avoid unjustifiable discrimination when seeking to derogate under GATT art. XX.)
While the Appellate Body ultimately championed Howse’s view, a plain
reading of its ruling in the original proceedings unquestionably imposed a
requirement upon the United States to negotiate international conservation
agreements.
161 See e.g., EC/Fur Seals, supra note 125 (explaining that no precedent exists
yet for the SPS Agreement, although such disputes may arise in the future); see
Marceau & Trachman, supra note 10, at 422 (highlighting even then, panels
regularly exercise judicial economy on the GATT claims, often depriving the
Appellate Body of the ability to “complete the analysis” for want of a sufficient
factual record). I will discuss pertinent SPS developments from the previous
decade before turning to the more recent TBT case law.
162 Although it is possible that more comprehensive import bans would prompt
the Appellate Body to resurrect its least restrictive means standard, pursuant to
which Members are required to use the least inconsistent measures reasonable
available to it when enacting trade-related measures. Under such a standard, a
PPM-related import ban could be less trade restrictive, while still producing
less trade-restrictive effects. The problem with this standard is that it has never
been applied as anything other than a crude cost-benefit tool, relied upon to
condemn on those measures that openly or outwardly violate core principles
of the WTO Agreements. See Alan O. Sykes, the Least Restrictive Means, 70
U. Chi. L. Rev. 403, 415-19 (2003). Whether or to what extent such a standard
could be applied to resolve more difficult questions linked to a country’s desired
level of regulatory protection is questionable. A related distinction can be drawn
between PPMs and non-product related (NPR) PPMs. There is little question
that WTO disciplines apply to product-related PPMs. A more contentious issue
is whether or to what extent a Member can extraterritorially condition entry
to its market on compliance with morally-loaded NPR PPMs. The Appellate
Body has adopted somewhat of a “see no evil, hear no evil” approach to this
contentious issue, by glossing over them in its findings. In US—Shrimp, for
instance, it deemed the issue moot given the migratory nature of sea turtles.
See US—Shrimp, supra note 119, at 133. Whether or to what extent a least
restrictive means standard will be rolled into the permissibility of resorting to
extraterritorial measures in future disputes will be an interesting development,
and one that could add some bite to an otherwise toothless standard.
163 Laura Nielsen, The WTO, Animals and PPMs, 128 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007)
(discussing the scope of the SPS Agreement).
164 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 33; EC/GMOs, supra
note 123.
165 See EC/GMO, supra note 123, at ¶ 7.68, (noting that in one dispute, a panel
ignored the relevance of the Biosafety Protocol, which drew criticism in an ILC
study and that particular panel report was not, unfortunately, appealed to the
Appellate Body); see Martti Koskenniemi (Chairman), Int’l L. Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law; Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
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protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.” Id.
176 Though DSU Art. 19.1 allows WTO panels to issue specific recommendations to aid with compliance, they tend to avoid doing so (“[i]n addition to its
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.”).
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185 Appellate Body Report, US/Tuna, supra note 140, at ¶ 297.
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189 See R. Wolfrum, P-T. Stoll, A. Seibert-Fohr & Max Planck, Commentaries
on World Trade Law: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 221-21 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007).
Particular attention would turn to the issuing international standardization
body under such analysis. In the above-mentioned dispute on US dolphin
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trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account
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